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The 1947 Smallpox
Vaccination
Campaign in New
York City, Revisited 
To the Editor: In 1947, millions of
New Yorkers received smallpox vacci-
nations, an accomplishment still appro-
priately held up as an example of pub-
lic health planning and mobilization.
Although now mythological, a review
of the events of April 1947, from
copies of The New York Times (1–9),
tells of a more recognizably human
response: pushing, jawing, deceit,
shortages, surpluses, and perhaps a
unusual way of counting vaccinees. 
In March 1947, a patient who had
recently visited Mexico traveled by
bus to New York City. He became ill,
was hospitalized, and, after his death,
found to have had smallpox. The occa-
sional case of smallpox had been seen
in the area for decades since the last
big outbreak in 1875, which had killed
2,000 New Yorkers. However, in
1947, a second case and then a third
appeared, and authorities became con-
cerned. On April 4, Israel Weinstein,
the New York City Health Com-
missioner, urged all New Yorkers who
had not been vaccinated since child-
hood to receive another vaccination. 
The program worked at the outset.
Free vaccine clinics were established
throughout the city, and doses were
given to private physicians for admin-
istration. During the first week, sur-
prisingly little public attention was
captured (Times articles typically
were brief and confined to page 21).
The story hit page 1 on April 13 (3),
after a second person died from the
disease. Mayor William O’Dwyer
urged all 7.8 million New York resi-
dents to receive the vaccine. Then he
rolled up his sleeve and was vaccinat-
ed by Dr. Weinstein. The city swiftly
swung into full crisis mode. Police,
fire, and health departments and hos-
pitals were mobilized to provide addi-
tional space for the effort. 
Two days later, epidemiologic
investigation indicated that all
patients with diagnosed cases were
related and that, in all likelihood, the
outbreak had been successfully halted
through tracing the movements of the
various patients and vaccinating any-
one who had contact with them, so-
called “ring” vaccination (4). Despite
this halt of the outbreak, the city
pushed forward. The campaign to “Be
sure, be safe, get vaccinated!” had
proven successful. By city estimate,
>600,000 persons had received vac-
cine in the first week.
Vaccine side effects, which domi-
nate coverage of today’s vaccination
program, were seldom discussed in
1947. Dr. Weinstein assured residents,
“Vaccination is painless. The skin is
not even broken by the needle.
Sometimes a soreness develops in the
armpit. If the arm becomes very sore,
apply an icebag” (4).  This advice is
simple compared to the depth and
breadth of information given today to
a potential vaccinee. Now, volunteers
are given several informational lec-
tures and a protracted individual inter-
view to discuss lingering questions,
and they are required to sign a docu-
ment confirming adequate compre-
hension and acceptance of the risks.
In the 1947 campaign, trouble
began on April 16, when (no longer
on page 1), the Times announced,
“Vaccinations Stop; Drug Supply
Gone; Thousands Turned Away” (5).
With little warning, and at the height
of the program, the vaccine supply
vanished, something that was never
explained. After spending days gear-
ing up citizens to receive the vaccine
quickly, the mayor and Dr. Weinstein
now had to downplay the urgency of
receiving vaccination. They assured
New Yorkers that a delay of a few
days or more represented “no health
hazard” (5).
Of the 1.2 million doses distrib-
uted by April 16, 1947, 42,000 had
been supplied by private laboratories,
far short of the promised number. In
contrast, the Army and Navy had
given almost 800,000 doses, and the
city’s public health laboratories had
made the remaining 400,000. 
During the shortage, the Times
noted, “hundreds of eager men,
women, and children queued up at
Bellevue Hospital at dawn, although
vaccinations were not scheduled to
begin until 10 a.m. At some stations,
the crowds did not take kindly to the
news that the doctors had run out of
vaccine and the police had a little dif-
ficulty dispersing a crowd of several
hundred” outside one vaccine station
(5). 
On April 17, the situation bright-
ened, when more than a million doses
suddenly arrived from private labora-
tories, and 500,000 persons were vac-
cinated (6). As the crisis slowly less-
ened, doctors were recruited at US$8
(US$64 in today’s market) for a 3-
hour session (or US$24 for all day;
US$192 in today’s market) to admin-
ister vaccine, but few volunteered.
Public health authorities in
Westchester County chided local
physicians for charging $35 per vac-
cine (7), and a 29-year-old woman,
dressed up as a nurse, vaccinated 500
people with water to impress her
“man companion” until she was sent
to the Bellevue psychiatric ward for
evaluation (8). 
Continued complaints about side
effects were dismissed by Dr.
Weinstein, who again advised those
whose arm ached that they only need-
ed to place an icebag in the armpit for
relief. Within a week, the program had
wound down and been proclaimed “a
miracle” (2) by all involved. 
The claim of 5 or 6 million vacci-
nations administered cannot be recon-
ciled against the daily tally reported in
the Times. If one assumes that day-to-
day numbers reported in the newspa-
per were roughly accurate, a simple
calculation places the number of vac-
cinees closer to 2.5 million, far short
of the announced total. For example,
on April 21, a grand total of 3.45 mil-
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lion recipients were reported; the next
day, after noting that only 200,000
additional persons had received vac-
cine, the total swelled to 4.4 million
(9).
These data reflect the difficulties
intrinsic to managing such a massive
program. The discrepancy may sim-
ply be a case of not adding columns of
numbers in a systematic way; howev-
er, the fuzzy numbers do have a cer-
tain appeal to the modern, more cyni-
cal reader. 
Whatever occurred, understanding
the specifics of “the great vaccination
miracle” of 1947 is important for
maintaining equilibrium during our
current smallpox vaccination program
and any future programs directed at
now-unanticipated infections. Not
just New York City’s, but the entire
country’s sense of confidence that it
can handle a major rapid vaccination
or pill distribution campaign leans
very heavily on the apocryphal vac-
cine campaign of April 1947. Yet, as
described above, there may be much
less to the miracle than meets the eye. 
Kent A. Sepkowitz*
*Infectious Disease Service, New York,
New York, USA
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Smallpox
Vaccination and
Adverse Cardiac
Events 
To the Editor: The incidence of
adverse cardiac events related to
smallpox vaccinations administered
during the National Smallpox
Vaccination Program (NSVP) in 2003
has received widespread attention.
From January 24 through August 8,
2003, suspected or probable myo- or
pericarditis was reported in 22 of
38,257 civilian vaccinees (1); as of
November 4, 2003, suspected or prob-
able myo- or pericarditis was reported
in 63 of 515,000 military vaccinees
(2). Additionally, cases of coronary
artery disease, including myocardial
infarction and cardiac death, were
reported in the weeks after vaccina-
tion although no causal link has been
established. 
An October 3, 2003, MMWR arti-
cle, “Cardiac deaths after a mass
smallpox vaccination campaign—
New York City, 1947” states that the
NYC experience suggests “…that car-
diac deaths observed in 2003 might
have been unrelated to smallpox vac-
cination.” While the causes of these
cardiac or coronary deaths have not
been established, the 1947 data lack
the power to address whether there is
a relationship to the vaccine. 
Cardiac or coronary deaths after
vaccination in 2003 were rare, with a
total of 3 of 488,550 military and
civilian vaccinees (6 per 1 million
vaccinees), approximately the same as
might be expected in a generally
healthy population. The total number
of cardiac or coronary deaths in 1947
during the 2-week estimated risk peri-
od after vaccination was 1,545. While
the denominator (number vaccinated
in the previous 4–17 days) was not
reported, a total of 6.4 million persons
were vaccinated during the 4 weeks of
the vaccination program. The 4-week
vaccination period would result in a 6-
week period of susceptibility for car-
diac death according to the 4–17 day
latency period. Thus, we extrapolate
that the denominator for the 2-week
observation period is approximately
2.1 to 6.4 million vaccinees at risk
during the study period. This would
mean that approximately 240 to 720
cardiac deaths occurred per million
vaccinees. 
Suppose that the 1947 smallpox
vaccine indeed caused serious cardiac
disease, including myopericarditis
and myocardial infarctions, with 10
fatal cases per million. Viewed in per-
spective, this would approximate the
historic rate of vaccine-induced
encephalitis and would be well in
excess of the historic rate of progres-
sive vaccinia. In this scenario, at a
hypothetical incidence of 10 per mil-
lion, from 21 to 64 of the 1,545 car-
diac deaths (1.4% to 4.1%, respective-
ly) would have been caused by the
vaccine. This magnitude of effect
would have been very difficult to
detect in this study. Thus, the results
of such investigations must be consid-
ered in the context of power limita-
tions. Further, studying death rates
sheds no light on cardiac illness such
as myo- or pericarditis. 
The proper interpretation of these
data is important given the national
policy impact that resulted from the
observation of cardiac and coronary
illness and death after vaccination in
2003. At this time, adverse cardiac
events associated with the vaccine,
particularly myo- or pericarditis, are
still of concern. Whether coronary or
cardiac deaths can be attributed to the
vaccine remains an open question. 
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